Data revenue constitutes an important source of income for securities exchanges.
For example, sales of consolidated equity market data in the United States generated approximately $400 Million in 2004, representing about 10-15% of total revenues reported by the largest exchanges, and substantially more for some of the smaller exchanges. By 2008, consolidated data sales revenue had increased to approximately $450 Million. 1 In the U.S., the process of collecting and disseminating quote data is managed by a set of industry "Plans." 2 These Plans also oversee the collection of fees charged for access to the consolidated data networks, and the allocation of the resulting revenue across the member exchanges.
Market structure in U.S. equity markets and the competitive structure of the industry have been in a state of dynamic evolution since the reforms of the late 1990s, and in particular since the passage of Regulation NMS in 2005. Among the most significant of these developments are the consolidation of ownership of the historic exchanges into a few large international groups, 3 the growth of Electronic Communications Networks (ECNs) and their subsequent mergers with or conversion to registered stock exchanges, 4 and the movement of the industry to a "make or take" fee structure.
A complete understanding of the economic forces driving this revolution must include an analysis of market data revenues, how these revenues are allocated across exchanges, and how the allocation mechanism might favor particular market structures in equilibrium. April 21, 2010 , and the Exchanges' public financial statements. 2 For securities listed on NYSE, AMEX, and other exchanges besides Nasdaq, data distribution is governed by The Consolidated Tape Association Plan (CTA) and the Consolidated Quotation Plan (CQ), which were created in the 1970s. For Nasdaq securities, data distribution is governed by the Nasdaq UTP Plan(UTP), created in 1990.
3 NYSE Euronext owns the NYSE and the exchanges formerly known as the AMEX and ARCA (owner of the original Pacific Exchange license); Nasdaq OMX Group owns Nasdaq, and the exchanges formerly known as the Boston Stock Exchange and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange.
In this paper, we take a step in this direction by documenting that the allocation of data revenue can impact investors' decisions of how and where execute and report a trade.
The formula used under the CTA plan until April 1, 2007 allocated revenue in proportion to the number of (round-lot) trades reported by each exchange. By linking revenue to trade reports, the allocation rule created an incentive for exchanges to pay for directed order flow, to enter into arrangements with brokers or ECNs to print trades that were executed off-exchange, and eventually to merge with ECNs.
In addition, this allocation formula assigned twice as much revenue for two trades of 100 shares than one of 200 shares. This created a situation where exchanges received more revenue when large orders were broken up and executed in multiple small pieces. Beginning in 1997, some of the exchanges implemented revenue-sharing or rebate programs, that created an incentive for brokers to split their customers' orders, and for proprietary traders to engage in algorithmic trading designed solely to capture the rebates.
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In this paper, we show that the original allocation formula created incentives that influenced the trading process. In particular, we demonstrate that average trade size is sensitive to changes in the marginal revenue per trade. Our evidence indicates that the distortive impact of the allocation rule is not spread evenly across all securities, but is concentrated in certain securities. We also find evidence that rebate programs were a key institutional mechanism through which the allocation rule influences the trading process.
Our analysis has four prongs. First, on December 1, 2004 the Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock (QQQ) moved its listing from AMEX to Nasdaq. Prior to the move, QQQ accounted for more than 40% of the trades on Network B. When these trades were removed, this increased the revenue per trade for those securities remaining in Network B. This event allows us to examine the effects of a change in incentives without the possibility of contamination from other factors associated with a security changing its primary listing venue. We find that when QQQ left, average trade size decreased for those securities remaining in Network B, particularly on those exchanges that had rebate programs.
Second,we examine trading activity for a sample of 40 Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) that switched primary listing from the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) on November 30, 2005. The effect of this move was immediate and striking. Comparing the three-month periods before and after the switch, we find that average trade size increased by more than a factor of five. Average trade size increased on all the exchanges but the extreme magnitude of the result was largely driven by changes in trading activity on exchanges with aggressive rebate programs. We also study the effect of this move on the stocks that remained listed on AMEX. As was the case for the QQQ migration, we again find evidence that average trading size decreased and the proportion of 100-share trades increased for the stocks remaining in Network B.
Third, between August 2005 and May 2006, six exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) adopted "Tape Shredding" rules prohibiting brokers from breaking up customer orders into smaller pieces for any reason other than best execution.
However, these rules place no restrictions on the actions of proprietary trading desks. By looking at the impact of these rules , we can evaluate the extent by which the breaking up of large orders into small orders is driven by broker agency trading, as opposed to proprietary trading. For the exchanges most involved in trading Network B securities, these rule changes went into effect in April and May of 2006. We examine whether these rules had any observable effect on average trade size. When we aggregate across securities, we find a sudden, economically large increase in average size of Network B trades on Nasdaq and NYSE Arca, both of which had rebate programs, but a decrease in average trade size on AMEX, which did not have a rebate program. This result disappears when securities are equally weighted in a paired t-test, confirming that tape shredding activity was concentrated in a relatively small number of securities. For Network A securities, where revenue per trade was lower, we find no significant increases in average trade size when these tape-shredding rules went into effect. Fourth, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) established a new allocation formula at the same time it adopted Regulation NMS, under which only one fourth of the revenue is allocated in proportion to the number of trades. 6 When the new formula went into effect on April 1, 2007, there was an immediate decrease in the marginal revenue allocated to an exchange as a result of splitting trades. However, there was no immediate change in the terms of the exchanges' rebate programs. Consistent with our earlier results for Network B securities, we find a statistically significant increase in average trade size on NYSE Arca, and a decrease on AMEX. Again, no significant increases in trade size were observed on Network A securities.
It has long been believed by industry participants and regulators that allocation formulas influence how trades are executed and reported. To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first comprehensive academic study of this topic. It confirms that the incentives created by allocation formulas are large enough to have a significant impact on average trade size, that revenue-sharing/rebate programs are a key mechanism used by the exchanges to align the incentives of order-flow providers with the exchange, and that distortive impact of the old allocation formula was significantly larger in Network B than in Network A.
Our results should be of interest to exchanges and regulators around the world, as they consider approaches to market data, and broader questions such as the extent to which market data should be considered a public good, whether and to what extent the distribution of market data should be consolidated across exchanges, and how property rights to market data should be assigned. Among the prior authors who have focused on these issues are 
B Revenue Sharing/Rebate Programs
In the late 1990s, exchanges began to introduce programs to share data revenue with the specialists or member firms that generated the order flow. When an exchange shares data revenue with member firms in proportion to how much revenue they generate, this creates an incentive to execute large orders in smaller pieces. were computed on a stock-by-stock basis, according to the specialist's monthly market share in that particular stock. Specialists received a rebate of 18% for all trades up to a market share of 7%, 36% for trades in excess of 7% and up to 12% market share, and 54% for trades above 12% of market share. Under the CSE program, members were credited on a pro rata basis, based upon the percentage of Network B transaction market share captured by the exchange in a given quarter, rebating 10% of revenues for stocks in which the CSE market share was below 3%, 25% when the market share was between 3% and 5%, 30% when the market share was between 5% and 7%, and 40% when the market share was at least 7%. The receive rebates, the amount of the pool for calculation purposes was based on 50% of the gross revenues derived from market data fees. The rebate program established a 50% transaction credit on revenues generated by Network A non-ETF securities and Network B securities, while the Network C program was based on a pro rata contribution of the operating revenues generated by each participant.
14 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 46293.
C Reporting Arrangements and Platform Mergers
Trading platforms that are not National Securities Exchanges are not eligible to participate directly in the consolidated revenue plans. However, trades executed on these platforms are reported through a participant exchange, or a trade-reporting facility connected to a participant. For example, trades executed on ECNs generate market data revenue for the exchange on which the ECN chooses to report. In cases where an ECN is able to attract a significant market share, the data revenue attached to those trades make the ECN particularly attractive to the exchanges, and vice versa. This synergy created an impetus for revenue sharing arrangements between exchanges and ECNs, and increased the attractiveness of mergers between exchanges and ECNs. Evidence that tape shredding was occurring on the QQQ prior to its departure from AMEX has been provided by Kugele and Wood (2006) . Analysis of this event is somewhat complicated by differences in market microstructure between AMEX and Nasdaq, and by the fact that the CTA allocation formula was different from the UTP formula. For these reasons, we do not conduct of formal analysis of changes in the QQQ itself. We merely note that average trade size in the QQQ more than doubled when it migrated to Nasdaq, as Nasdaq, Arca Ex, Chicago, and National experienced significant declines in average trade size. Of particular note, average trade size declined the most on Arca Ex (-31%) and Chicago (-17%)-the same exchanges that experienced the largest increase in trade size on the QQQs. Table II shows the distribution of trade sizes on Network B stocks on each exchange before and after the migration. It shows the percentage of reported trades in each of six size buckets, including trades of 100 shares, trades between 101 and 499 shares, trades between 500 and 999 shares, trades between 1000 and 2499 shares, and trades above 2500 shares. We find an economically important increase in the proportion of 100-shares trades on ARCA Ex and the regional exchanges. For example, the proportion of 100-share trades on the remaining Network B stocks increased from approximately 24% to 35% on Nasdaq, 74% to 84% on Arca Ex, 23% to 39% on Chicago, and 25% to 58% on National. This confirms that the changes in mean are largely driven by the changes in the number of small trades, not by changes in the number of block trades.
[ Table II here]
The results in Tables I and II provide evidence of tape shredding in Network B securities, and in particular that the amount of tape shredding is sensitive to the marginal revenue to per trade. To further explore whether tape shredding is confined to a certain type of securities, we partitioned our sample in various ways and repeated our analysis. In the interest of space, we do not include numeric results here, but we find that among the securities remaining on Network B, the significant changes in average trade size are observed for both ETFs and nonETFs. 15 The evidence of tape shredding appears to be stronger for higher-volume securities, but is not confined to only the top decile or even the top half of securities. There appears to be no obvious relation between tape shredding and price level.
Inasmuch as a relatively small number of very large block trades can have a big impact on average trade size, as a robustness check we repeated our analysis throwing out all block trades of over 10,000 shares. We found that our results were qualitatively unchanged (results not reported).
III Securities Switching from AMEX to NYSE
In the previous section, we examined changes in trading patterns surrounding the migration of the QQQ from AMEX to Nasdaq. However, we did not formally examine changes in trading patterns on the QQQ itself, in part because we believed it would be hard to disentangle the effects of tape shredding from the effects of changing the primary listing from a specialist structure to a dealership structure. It is well-known that trades are reported differently on the specialist exchanges and Nasdaq, making direct comparisons difficult.
Furthermore, the analysis of the change in marginal incentive to split large trades into small trades is complicated by the fact that CTA and UTP plans used different allocation formulas.
However, securities migrating from AMEX to NYSE remain within CTA, within a specialist market structure, and the primary listing remained with an exchange that did not have a rebate program. Although there are some differences between NYSE and AMEX, we believe for the purposes of isolating the effects of a change in marginal revenue per trade, a move from AMEX to NYSE is a cleaner natural experiment than is a move from AMEX to Nasdaq.
As mentioned before, market data revenues are collected and allocated separately for NYSE-listed ("Network A") and AMEX-listed ("Network B") securities. Analysis of this event is somewhat contaminated by a confounding event. Having been purchased by Nasdaq, iNet ECN stopped reporting its trades on National and began reporting them on Nasdaq during the first week of January 2006. This caused a sudden change in the composition of trades reported on those two exchanges. Accordingly, we exclude these two exchanges from our examination of three-month event windows before and after the migration. To compensate, we perform additional analysis based on one-month event windows, which are short enough to exclude the confounding event in January.
[ Table III here]
Our results are reported in Table III, 95% on Arca, and 96% on the National Exchange. After they migrated to Network A, these numbers drop to approximately 25%, 32%, and 30%. On these three exchanges, the huge decrease in the proportion of 100 share trades is offset by increases in the each of the other five trade-size buckets.
[ 
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[ Table V here]
The results in table VI indicate a modest increase in the percentage of 100-share trades on Nasdaq from 54.77% to to 57.27%, on Arca Ex from 73.84% to 78.36%, and on National from 69.64% to 72.2%, for the one-month window.
[ Table VI here]
In a parallel exercise, not reported here, we examined whether changes in trading patterns were observed when individual stocks switch from Amex to NYSE. Using the annual NYSE Fact Books and press releases issued by the NYSE, we identified 164 stocks that switched from AMEX to NYSE between 1993 and 2005. In summary, we find a statistically signicant increase in the number of trades, but no statistical evidence that moving from AMEX to NYSE was associated with a change in trade size. We find that only one exchange (National) experienced a significant increase in average trade size when stocks migrated from AMEX to NYSE.
IV Tape Shredding Rules
In 2005 and 2006, the exchanges and NASD proposed (and the SEC approved) rules designed to reduce tape shredding. Specifically, these rules prohibit the unbundling of customer orders for reasons other than best execution.
In this section, we investigate whether the implementation of these rules had an appreciable effect on trading. Because these rules apply specifically to brokers who are handling customer orders on an agency basis, they would not affect order splitting by proprietary trading operations. Thus, looking at how trading activity changed when these rules became effective helps shed light on the extent to which our other results are driven by the behavior of brokers, as opposed to the activities of proprietary trading desks.
If the practice of order splitting by brokers was prevalent prior to these rules, and if these rules were effective at reducing the practice, we would expect to see an increase in average trade size surrounding the implementation of these rules. If the response of the market to revenue allocation incentives is confined exclusively to proprietary trading operations, we would expect these tape shredding rules to have little or no effect.
In the appendix, we provide a table summarizing the date of the original proposal, the approval date and effective date for the tape shredding rules implemented by each of the Self-Regulatory Organizations. In some cases, the adopted rules reflect amendments filed after the original proposal date. In addition, we attempted to identify the date that these rules became effective, or the date that exchange members were informed of the rule. In [ Table VII here]
In contrast, we find a significant decline in average trade size of Network B securities traded on AMEX and the National Stock Exchange. It is not obvious why the implementation of a tape shredding rule should decrease average trade size. But since all of these exchanges implemented their rules at roughly the same time, it is possible that these rule changes induced a change in the equilibrium mix of large and small traders across exchanges. [ Figure 5 here] 
V New Allocation Rule
In this section, we examine changes in trading activity surrounding April 1, 2007 , when the new allocation formula went into effect. One of the aims of the formula change was to reduce the incentive for tape shredding. As mentioned above, the new formula allocates only 25%
of the data revenue in proportion to the number of trades, with another 25% allocated in proportion to share volume and 50% in proportion to a measure of the aggressiveness with which the exchange quotes at the inside of the market. Thus, the immediate effect of the new formula was to reduce by about 75% the additional revenue allocated to the exchange when a large trade is split into multiple smaller trades. small but statistically significant decline in average trade size reported on National. We also observe significant decreases in the average size of Network A trades on some of the smaller exchanges. Given that these exchanges also experienced significant changes in total volume, it is somewhat difficult to know to extent to which these changes in average change size may be influenced by other changes in the market.
[ Table VIII here]
The second panel of VIII reports the same statistics for Network B. We find that average trade size on Network B stocks increased by about 5% on NYSE/Arca, and decreased by 13% on AMEX. Both of these changes are statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.
Again, the allocation formula appears to be associated with trade splitting on NYSE/Arca, but not on AMEX. In Table VIII , we find no significant change in the average size of Network B trades reported on Nasdaq or the National Stock Exchange. Interestingly, we do find an statistically significant increase in average trade size for Network B securities trading on NYSE.
We note that formula change on April 1 did not only decrease the incentive for tape shredding, it also increased the incentive for exchanges to quote aggressively. If some exchanges responded more than others to this incentive, those that are quoting most aggressively may have attracted more order flow, or a different kind of order flow as a result. Thus, the change in the allocation formula may have caused a change in average trade size for reasons other than changes in tape shredding.
Finally, we should note that although the changes in Network B activity reported for NYSE Arca and AMEX are statistically significant, the economic magnitude of these changes is smaller than for some of the other tests considered in this paper. Unlike some of the other events studied in this paper, where a simple visual examination of a graph reveals a sudden regime change on the event date, the effects documented in Table VIII for Network B stocks appear to have occurred gradually over time.
In this respect, our evidence in this section is somewhat weaker than in other sections.
One possible reason for this is that when the new formula went into effect, the exchanges did not immediately alter their rebate programs, but continued to share revenue in proportion to the number of trades. To the extent that rebate programs are the key mechanism through which the allocation formula affects markets, we might expect the main impact of the new formula to occur only after the terms of these programs are modified to align the incentives of order flow providers with those of the exchange.
VI Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored several facets of how the trading process is affected by the formulas used for allocating data revenue in proportion to the number of trades. Our results indicate that the old, proportional allocation rule had a strong influence under certain circumstances, but in other cases appears to have a minimal impact. The effect has been most severe where the revenue per trade is greatest (Network B), and on those exchanges that have developed mechanisms to exploit the formula. Moreover, our evidence indicates that the effects of the allocation rule are particularly concentrated in certain securities, such as certain Exchange Traded Funds. More research is needed to clarify the characteristics of securities that are associated with tape shredding. We have not investigated whether there is anything peculiar about ETFs that makes them particularly attractive for tape shredding, or whether the ETFs merely happened to be among the highest-volume securities trading in Network B.
We hope that by demonstrating that data revenue allocation has had an important influence on the trading process, this paper will stimulate further research on the nature of competition between exchanges. Three significant sources of revenues for the exchanges are listing fees, transaction fees, and data revenues. We would suggest that in the distant past, it was largely the case that these three revenue sources were closely tied to listing.
That is, whichever exchange obtained the primary listing would also attract the dominant market share of transaction volume, and trades were reported where they were executed, so transaction fees and market data revenue were determined mostly by listing. But this has changed significantly since the mid 1990s, partially as a result of the economic forces and institutional developments explored in this paper. Today, there is vigorous competition for transaction volume, to the point that it is becoming less and less relevant where the stock is listed. This has especially been true of AMEX-listed securities, where the primary listing exchange is no longer one of the two largest trading venues. For Network A securities, the New York Stock Exchange has also faced intense competition in the past few years.
Apparently, primary listing no longer gives the listing exchange a significant advantage in the competition for order flow.
Similarly, we should note that a significant portion of all trading volume is either executed on ECNs or internalized, but this trading activity can only generate data revenue through a reporting channel. The research community must appreciate that there is an important distinction between competition among trading venues to execute trades and competition among plan participants to report trades that are executed off of the exchanges. The examples depicted in figures 1 and 2 illustrate that this becomes particularly important when an ECN that is unaffiliated with an exchange gains significant market share.
Along these lines, a notable development was the creation of trade reporting facilities. In were reported to the tape using a single letter to designate the reporting channel. An observer could not distinguish by looking at the one-letter designation whether the trade was executed on the exchange or only reported there. Now, there is a two-letter designation that enables observers to make this distinction. 18 This new information might create new opportunities for researchers to study off-exchange trading activity.
Another interesting topic that we do not address here is the extent to which the new allocation formula has led to greater depth at the NBBO. By assigning 50% of the revenue on the basis of quoting activity, the new formula should encourage more aggressive quoting.
Further research in this area could shed light on whether the new formula succeeded in this regard, and perhaps reveal other ways that the exchanges have responded in the face of this new incentive.
Other interesting research questions relating to equity markets are likely to emerge in the coming years. The equity trading industry is currently going through a period of rapid structural change, as a result of a confluence of many inter-related forces and trends. Among these are the demutualization of exchanges, the separation of the regulatory function from the exchanges, national and international consolidation, a blurring of the boundary between the securities industry and the commodities and futures industry, the Reg NMS order protection rule, new trading technologies that have significantly decreased the role of a physical trading floor, the increasing prevalence of "high frequency" and "low latency" trading, and the emergence of new "dark" trading platforms for institutional trading. As the industry moves towards a new equilibrium, new issues will arise and undoubtedly, a new generation of research will emerge. To the extent that market data revenue continues to be a major revenue source for exchanges, it is likely that data revenue will continue to play a significant role in shaping the industry. 
